

Ziya Gökalp and the Development of Sociology Education in Turkey

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Abstract

The development of sociology in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century is closely related to the modernization efforts of Ottoman state bureaucracy and ideological discussions of rising intellectuals on the future of the Empire. To a great extent, these rising intellectual movements, namely Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism, were trying to revive the Ottoman State from the *impasse*, which was the consequence of losing power against the West. Both the socio-political atmosphere and intellectual climate of the era were the main conditions that gradually shaped the direction and development of sociology in Turkey. The aim of this study is to elucidate socio-cultural and ideological factors influential in the development of sociology education in Ottoman-Turkish society. This study further aims to evaluate Gökalp's role in and contribution to the development of sociology education in Turkey. This study also claims that of the modern Turkish intellectuals Gökalp is very crucial in terms of grasping both the secular dimension of the modern western civilization and unique characteristics of Turkish society.

Keywords: Turkish Sociology, Ziya Gökalp, Modernization, Turkish Intellectual

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INTRODUCTION

Following the Ottoman-Russian War in Crimea between 1789 and 1792, the defeat of the Turkish army and the land losses first starting with Crimea and continuing with the Caucasus led to new quests among Ottoman statesmen for renewal and modernization of the military. The first efforts to renew the Ottoman army began during the reign of Sultan Selim III but his efforts to abolish the Janissary corps ended with a catastrophe for him. The Sultan paid the price for this attempt with his life. After Selim III, Mahmud II succeeded to the throne and he did not only abolish Janissary corps but also extended his reform/modernization efforts from the military to other socio-cultural areas, particularly the educational system and state bureaucracy. Moreover, during his rule, the Ottoman state had close contact with Europe. New embassies were established in Western countries, especially in France and England; many Turkish students were sent to these countries to have modern education, especially in the area of physical sciences. Despite all these efforts of reformation, the territorial losses in the Balkans, the main hinterland of the Ottoman Empire, still continued under the influence of both Russian propagation and Western states' economic dominance in the region. As a matter of fact, after the eighteenth century, Ottoman economy had become more and more dependent to the Western capitalist world economy, which significantly increased in later years, especially after the *Balta Limani Treaty* of 1838 signed between the Ottoman State and England and “[t]he avenue of influence thus opened to Europe was widened by the proclamation of the 1856 liberal reform charter called the *Tanzimat*” (Berkes, 1936, p. 240). The non-Muslim citizens of the Empire were now legally protected by Western states and thus they became more advantageous than the Muslim subjects of the empire especially in commerce and trade, which naturally brought about discomfort and upheavals not only among the members of the Ottoman state bureaucracy but also in the other groups of society, and even the ordinary Muslim citizens of the empire became upset with the emerging situation (Çetinkaya, 2014, p. 210). As a reaction to this situation, therefore, the members of the *Party of Union and Progress* aimed to create a national bourgeoisie from the Muslim subjects of the empire. This aim subsequently became the main economic policy of the modern Turkish Republic too:

...Towards the end of the nineteenth century a new group was emerging within the Moslem population, whose material conditions-whether as petty producers or specialists in accounting and maximization- allowed them to acquire a notion of the social system substantially different from the traditional Ottoman one. This group, although later participating in the Young Turk and Kemalist projects, and supporting the Turkification of the economy, found itself in conflict with the mainstream of the bureaucratic class, precisely because of its more liberal conception of the social and economic order (Keyder, 1987, p. 41).

In terms of the development of sociology in Ottoman-Turkish society, sociology can be said to have an institutional embodiment immediately after the rise of French sociology in Europe in the nineteenth century, which is also closely related to the emergence of modern intellectuals in the Ottoman-Turkish society. In the nineteenth century, the rise of The Ottoman-Turkish intellectual was mostly due to the above-mentioned modernization efforts of the Ottoman state itself. Therefore, the main concern of the rising intellectual movements of the era - Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism- was strongly focused on a central question: How to revive the Ottoman State from the *impasse* as a result of losing power against the West. In this atmosphere intellectuals commonly directed their orientation to Western thought, especially sociology, in order to find out solutions to the problems resulted from sudden changes such as Europe's increasing political and economic dominance in the Balkan region and the rise of political upheavals and nationalist movements among the non-Muslim subjects of the empire (Coşkun, 1991, p. 13). In these worsening economic and political conditions of the empire, the main concern of both the rising Ottoman intellectuals and the members of modern state bureaucracy was similar and mostly centered on such a question as “how to save Ottoman State” from the *impasse*, resulted from the loss of power against the West. Although they were opposing to the increasing domination of the West over the Ottoman Empire, they sought solutions to their socio-

economic problems either in ideologies or philosophies that became widespread after the Enlightenment in the West.

The Three Intellectual Movements in Ottoman-Turkish Society: Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism

The rising Turkish intellectuals in the nineteenth century had entirely similar views on the modernization (*muasırlaşma*) of Ottoman-Turkish society in spite of their substantial ideological differences in many aspects. Contrary to traditional *ulema*, these modern ideologies - Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism and Westernism - sought the solution not in tradition, but in the Western science and technology that they conceived as an essential dimension of modernization. In other words, they naively believed that the future of the Ottoman state rested in modernization, especially in its ability to transfer Western science and technology to Ottoman-Turkish society. However, they did not have any agreement on the role of the Western culture in this process. Although they had a similar view on the technological and scientific supremacy of the modern West, they had different approaches to the cultural elements of Western societies. Therefore, the main discussion of Turkish intellectuals in the nineteenth century was about the distinction between culture and civilization. They discussed modernization mostly on the concepts of culture and civilization.

In the nineteenth century, the first intellectual movement emerged in the Ottoman State was Ottomanism of which popularity was primarily rooted in some socio-cultural factors in Ottoman society. As a response to the rise of nationalist sentiments in many parts of the Ottoman empire, especially in the Balkan region, the leaders of Young Turks, namely Namuk Kemal and Ziya Pasha, aimed not only to develop a common ideological identity that would hold all non-Muslim and Muslim subjects together under the same banner [Ottomanism] but also to make the necessary legal and political arrangements (Kaçmazoğlu, 2013, p. 137-138). Young Ottomans turned their faces to the political ideas and concepts developed in the modern West to create an ideological ground for their ideals; with these objectives in their mind, they tried to find out their counterparts of such Western concepts in Islamic tradition, especially those regarding state and society. In relation to this aim of Young Ottoman intellectuals, Mardin claims that Namuk Kemal's intension was to make a "synthesis between Islamic and Western political conceptions" (Mardin, 1962, p. 287). In fact, however, Namuk Kemal's views, especially his formulization of the concept of homeland, are not identical with the concept of nation-state developed in the modern West; rather his conception of it encompasses all the geographies from North Africa to the Balkan region that were under the control of the Ottoman State.

It is possible to see the Ottomanists' views on culture, in particular, Islam by considering Namuk Kemal's objections and opposition to Ernest Renan's views on Religion and Science. Ernest Renan held a conference in Paris, where he blamed all religions, including Islam for hindering all civilizational developments especially techno-scientific developments in human history. Shortly after this conference, his views on Islam and science echoed in the Muslim World, especially among the Ottoman intellectuals who intensively debated whether or not Islam as religion hindered the technological and scientific developments that existed in all human history. Namuk Kemal was the first intellectual in the Muslim world who harshly criticized Ernest Renan's views on Islam in his book, *Renan Müdafanamesi*, which subsequently inspired many articles and books written by the Muslim intellectuals against Renan in the Muslim World (Mardin, 1962, p. 324-325). Moreover, as Aydın states, "The rejection of Muslim intellectuals against the thesis put forward by Ernest Renan in his speech 'Islam and Science'...deeply affected the approaches to both the history of Islam and Ottoman science" (Aydın, 2004, p. 33). In fact, their objection was not to Western science and technology but to socio-cultural factors of Europe, since they did not conceive any contradiction between modern science and technology developed in the West and the cultural values of Muslims, resulted from the true essence of Islam. In the nineteenth century, just like other conservative groups, they believed that Islam did not impede progress. Therefore, Namuk Kemal's objections and opposition to Ernest Renan's views on religion and science obviously reflect their common approach

to Western science and technology and the distinction they made between the (Western) civilization and culture.

On the other hand, the territorial losses in the Balkans had a negative effect on Ottomanism. It may be considered as an important factor in the orientation of Turkish intellectuals towards such new ideological quests as Islamism, Turkism and (ultra) Westernism. The loss of the Balkans could be seen as the main reason for the prevalence of pessimism and despair among the Turkish intellectuals, which resulted in, as in the case of Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, the rise of followers of prominence and prevalence of the French materialist philosophy. Gökalp was defending Ottomanism until the loss of the Balkans, but later under the influence of Akçura and Hüseyinzade Ali, he became not only the follower of the Turkish nationalism but also a leading figure of the Party of Union and Progress and Modern Turkish State.

After Ottomanism, Islamism became far more popular among Turkish intellectuals in the nineteenth century. Unlike the Young Ottomans, who aimed to develop an ideology that would hold all subjects (Muslim and non-Muslim) of the empire under the same banner, Islamists were defending the political and territorial unity of all Muslim believers (ummah) against Western imperialism. In fact, this view of Islamists largely coincided with the pan-Islamist politics of Abdulhamid II (Akçura, 1976, p. 22-23). Yet, there were many similarities between Ottomanism and Islamism in virtue of their approach to Western civilization and culture. Just like the Ottomanists, they made a distinction between science and technology and Western culture, and many of them were of the opinion that in essence Islam as a religion did not contradict with the scientific and technological developments, either existed in the West or in any parts of the world, even in China; yet their objections were directed to religious and cultural dynamics of Western societies. Therefore, many Islamists of the era believed that in order to revive Ottoman society from the *impasse*, they could, just like the Japanese Empire did, transfer science and technology from the West and thus build their Islamic civilization solely on the grounds of their own religious values and culture. However, Westernist intellectuals rejected Islamists' distinction between the elements of Western civilization (science and technology) and culture on the grounds that it was impossible to make a clear distinction between civilization and culture.

In relation to the development and ideological background of Westernist intellectuals, it could be claimed that as it was evident in the case of Abdullah Cevdet, many of them were profoundly affected by the French Enlightenment which was materialist in essence. The following factors were very crucial in terms of both the diffusion and prominence of Western thoughts and the rise of Westernist ideas in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. After the establishment of embassies in many European cities in this century, the Ottoman intellectuals and statesmen closely became acquainted with the western culture together with rising ideologies of the time. The Ottoman State had established embassies in many European cities and sent statesmen to these cities for political and economic reasons. Similarly, many Turkish students were sent to Western countries, especially France with the purpose of having an education on physical sciences so that they would later be the active agents in transferring western science and technology to the Ottoman State. In spite of this fact, in time they were very much influenced by the Enlightenment Philosophy, other social sciences, and Western literature and they conveyed these views to the Ottoman Empire, especially by means of translations. As Ülken (2007, p. viii-ix) states, materialist views of French intellectuals were conveyed to the Ottoman Empire largely by intellectuals interested in literature and poetry at that time.

Another intellectual movement that emerged in the nineteenth century was Turkism. Like Ottomanism and Islamism, the rise of Turkism in the Ottoman state was mostly affected by land losses in the Balkans and the Middle East Regions. However, before Turkism emerged in the lands of the Ottoman Empire, it had already begun to be popular among the Turkic communities in Russia, especially the Crimean and Kazan Tatars. It was these Turkish intellectuals who came to the Ottoman Empire from Russia carried Turkism and nationalist sentiments to the Ottoman geography. Among these Turkic intellectuals of Russia, Yusuf Akçura was the most prominent figure in particular because

he put Turkism as a political ideology first on the agenda of Ottoman-Turkish intellectuals (Kaçmazoğlu, 2013, p. 137).

In his book, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, Akçura evaluated the three popular ideologies of his time, namely Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism in terms of their significance for the future of the Ottoman State. He claimed that neither Ottomanism nor Islamism could be effective in maintaining the power and the integrity/unity of the Ottoman State at a time when nationalism was spreading rapidly and effectively in the Balkans and the Middle East. Therefore, as he was aware of the role of Islam in maintaining social solidarity and integrity, he believed that the sense of solidarity offered by religion should be also used for the unity of the Turkish world. Moreover, it was Akçura who first pointed out the secular and individualist characteristics of the modern West just like Gökâlp would discuss it later (Akçura, 1976, p. 24-35). As stated above, Akçura was a very influential figure in the rise of Turkism as a political ideology in Ottoman society. As Tokluoğlu (2012, p. 124-125) indicated that Akçura and Hüseyinzade Ali's views influenced Ziya Gökâlp's understanding of the Turkish nationalism. However, according to some, there are differences between Akçura and Gökâlp in terms of their understanding of Turkism and Turkish nationalism. For instance, unlike Akçura's political Turkism (pan-Turanism), Gökâlp's understanding of nationalism is not Pan Turkism but it is mostly based on the ideal of creating a new Turkish nation from different ethnicities living in Anatolia. In other words, he tried to formulate 'Turkishness' as a unifying principle that holds different ethnic elements in Anatolia under the same identity.

Gökâlp's views on modernization do not see enormous differences among the thesis of various intellectual groups in the Ottoman empire such as Islamism, Modernization and Turkification. On the contrary, he believes that despite their ideological differences, they share a common view regarding the modernization of Ottoman-Turkish society because they essentially recognize this process as vital for the future of the Ottoman Empire. Even Gökâlp himself perceives Islamism, Modernization and Turkification as the most important dynamics of Ottoman-Turkish society that could complement each other. Nevertheless, he criticizes the thesis of both Islamist and Westernist intellectuals of his age in the sense that neither Ottomanism nor Islamism could be effective in maintaining the power and the integrity/unity of the Ottoman State at a time when nationalism was spreading rapidly and effectively in the Balkans and the Middle East. He also condemns Westernist intellectuals in their efforts as they already failed to recognize the individualistic dimension of the Enlightenment philosophy. However, for Gökâlp, what is necessary for Turkish society is not individualism, but "collective consciousness" and social solidarity (Berkes, 1954, p. 382-383). As stated by Davison (1998) he is one of the intellectuals of the nineteenth century who noticed both the individualistic and the secular dimension of modern society. Consequently, in his *oeuvre*, his main objective is not only to question the realization Turkish nation state in the age of nationalism but also to find out proper ways to a healthy interaction between Western civilization and national culture at a time when secularism is becoming the main characteristics of modern society. Therefore, he directed his attention to sociology since he believed that only sociology as positive science could perform important functions in identifying the basic characteristics of Turkish culture which are crucial for understanding the dimensions of Turkish modernization:

His writings, both scholarly and popular, were shaped by science has a social purpose. Impacted by French sociology (in particular he believed that sociology and history should play an active role in politics, the formation of what he termed the "national ideal (mefkure) (Dressler, 2015, p. 512).

Ziya Gökâlp and the Development of Turkish Sociology

It is evident that the above-stated ideological movements which were emerged in the nineteenth century with the sole motivation of reviving the Ottoman State against the rising dominance of the West did not have any philosophical or intellectual tradition, which was the case in the Western culture. Although the Enlightenment philosophy in the West developed against medieval thought, it

preserved its continuity with the philosophical tradition that stemmed from the ancient Greek philosophy. For example, as Çav indicates that for Cahit Tanyol, one of the prominent Turkish sociologists, unlike Western societies, the development of sociology in Turkey is not stemmed from any philosophical tradition; its development was rather the result of the prominence of history among the Ottoman intellectuals. Therefore, Tanyol perceived Ahmad Cavdat Pasha as “the first founder of sociology in Turkey” (Çav, 2020, p. 27). Tanyol’s perception of Ahmet Cavdat Pasha as the first founder of Turkish sociology is largely due to Ibn Khaldun’s influence on the views of Cavdat Pasha in relation to history and society. Concerning the Ottoman philosophical tradition Berkes is of the opinion that until the nineteenth century, there were only two prominent philosophical traditions that had validity among the Ottoman *litrati*: Of these two traditions, Aristotelian tradition was the most extensive and prominent “philosophy among the Turkish thinkers of the Empire since [a]ll the thinkers of the Ottoman period followed the same tradition of endless reinterpretations of the Aristotelian philosophy” (Berkes, 1936, p. 238). Although Berkes considered this Aristotelian tradition as “the dominant philosophy” among the Ottoman thinkers, the second tradition mostly influenced by Ibn Khaldun’s philosophy of history was very crucial in terms of the development of Turkish sociology in modern times:

Another tradition exerting a direct influence upon modern sociology had been followed by Turkish historians... The second school of historians, which arose after the sixteenth century, had been influenced by Ibn Khaldun's philosophy of history. Particularly influenced by the latter's Prolegomena to his history, these Turkish historians recognized a new notion of historical causality. Mustafa B. Abdullah Katib Chelebi, better known as Haji Khalifah (1609-57), in his Chronology of History, gives an organismic interpretation of history. Each state, according to him, passes through the periods of growth, maturity, and decay and gives way to new forms (Berkes, 1936, p. 239).

At the same time, for him, these two traditions, namely “Aristotelian philosophy” and Ibn Khaldunian “theological and geographical-organismic interpretations of history” were so extensive among the Ottoman literati until the nineteenth century, “when the Turks gradually turned to Western thought” (Berkes, 1936, p. 239). For instance, Naima and Ahmad Cavdat Pasha did not only translate some parts of Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddima* from Arabic to Ottoman Turkish but also tried to explain the Ottoman history, in particular the decline of the empire by referring to Ibn Khaldun’s views on socio-cultural elements causing the collapse of the state. Therefore, just like Tanyol, many Turkish sociologists such as Sezer and Ülken also recognized Cavdat Pasha as the first sociologist before Turkish intellectuals turned their face to western philosophy and sociology.

The rise of sociology in Ottoman-Turkish society was rooted in Ottoman intellectuals’ curiosity in European thought in order to seek solutions to their socio-economic problems. Yet, even in modern times, as it can be seen in the examples of Naima and Cavdat Pasha, the Ottoman *ilmiyye* (traditional scholars) generally sought solutions to such problems by referring to either these two classical traditions or Islamic jurisprudence. Until the rise of the first reforms movements in the military, especially in Navy School (*Bahriye Mektebi*) in the eighteenth century, either Ottoman statesmen or the members of *ilmiyye* class as in the case of Koçibey, tried to solve their socio-economic problems by referring to ongoing practices or tradition. Ottoman statesmen or the members of *ilmiyye* class interpreted their problems both in the economic realm and political area as a deviation from the practices of (an idealized) past. As late as the nineteenth century, a great scholar and statesman like Ahmet Cavdat Pasha sought solutions to existing socio-economic problems of the Ottoman state in the views of Ibn Khaldun who lived in North Africa five centuries before him. Therefore, the rise of modern intellectuals and the spread of Western thought among the Ottoman intellectuals in the nineteenth century started when Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals gradually turned their curiosity to Western thought and philosophies in general and French Sociology in particular.

On the other hand, in the nineteenth century Ottoman World, these rising ideological movements, even Islamism, mostly stemmed from the increasing contacts between Turkish intellectuals and politicians and Western culture and new ideologies, especially the post-Enlightenment philosophies. As Tuna pointed out that “the development of sociology in Turkey began quite early compared to many Western countries” (Tuna, 1991, p. 31). The interest of Turkish intellectuals and statesmen to Western philosophy and sociology was largely due to political and ideological reasons, especially their quests and efforts to “save the state” from the impasse resulted from the rising dominance of the West in the Ottoman geography. This ideal of “preventing the state from the collapse” prompted the Turkish intellectual to engage with all kinds of ideas and ideological movements developed in the West (Tuna, 2015, p. 4). According to Berkes, “the influence of European social thought” on Turkish statesmen and intellectuals in a real sense began to increase after the *Tanzimat*:

They had been, however, already acquainted with Western thought. Before the proclamation of the *Tanzimat*, Raif Mahmud Efendi, who had lived for several years in England and who was one of the first translators of scientific books from English, had repeatedly urged the adaptation of the English political system to Turkey. Reshid Pasha, who was chiefly responsible for the reform charter, and actually the writer of it, had lived in London and Paris as a diplomat. The influence of European social thought appeared, however, in a more systematic way only after the *Tanzimat* (Berkes, 1936, p. 239-240).

Following the *Tanzimat*, many Turkish intellectuals and statesmen such as Ibrahim Shinasi, Ziya Pasha, and Namuk Kemal, went to European cities as students or exiles, where they “developed their political doctrine” and “interested in many fields in literature, philosophy, political science, history, and economics.” During their stay in European cities, most of them also wrote many books and translated the books of Western philosophers into Turkish to defend “the constitutional government” (Berkes 1936:240). Besides, although they were influenced by the different social/philosophical thoughts in the West, French sociology exerted great influence on the development of sociology in Turkey. Regarding this influence of French sociology on the development of Turkish sociology, Sezer (2012, p. 29) is of the opinion that the development of sociology in Turkey could be divided into two main periods: “the first period of its development is outweighed by the effect of French sociology” and subsequently it was American sociology which determined the later development of sociology in Turkey, especially after the 1960s. Most of the Turkish intellectuals who went to Paris as political exiles or students were not only interested in French social and political thoughts, especially French Sociology but also had a very intimate and close relationship with French sociologists too. Ahmet Riza is conceived as the first Ottoman dissident who had an intimate relationship with French sociologists. However, it is also known that before Ahmet Riza, especially during the *Tanzimat* period, for instance, Comte, the founder of sociology had a close relationship with Ottoman politicians, especially Mustafa Reşid Pasha who was known as the architect of the *Tanzimat* reforms in the Ottoman society. Nevertheless, Comte’s ideas found a little echo among the Ottoman intellectuals. It is also known that Ali Suavi interested in *Le Play School* before Ahmet Riza and Prince Sabahaddin (Tuna, 1991, p. 31). Similar to Ahmet Riza, another Ottoman positivist, Abdullah Cevdet had a close relationship with Gustav La Bon, a French social psychologist and even translated his books into Turkish (Sezer, 2012, p. 29). Furthermore, Prince Sabahaddin and Ziya Gökalp had a decisive role in the introduction and the development of Turkish Sociology. According to Berkes, Prince Sabahaddin “was the first sociologist of the Westernist Turkish thinkers... [as a] physical scientist like...Le Play...studied in Paris from 1904 to 1906 with the followers of the Le Play school... contended that private ownership is the foundation of the modern state and” (Berkes, 1936, p. 241).

Prince Sabahaddin, as a follower of French sociological tradition, that is *Le Play*, had far more liberal tendency since he saw the future of the Ottoman Empire in the development of liberalism and private ownership. He did not only accept *Le Play*'s sociological views, formulized in *Les ouvriers*

européens but also, in line with *Le Play's* views, criticized the centralist state tradition of the Ottoman empire. For him, the main difference between Western and Eastern societies results from the fact that in the West individualism is the basis of all kinds of socio-cultural developments and freedom; however, in the East, especially in the Ottoman Empire, it is the state power that shapes all areas of human life. Therefore, for him, it is a futile effort to modernize Ottoman society without the development of an individualistic culture that is the most important characteristic of Western societies (Sabahaddin, 1965, p. 44). On the other hand, as many Turkish sociologists, especially Niyazi Berkes and Hilmi Ziya Ülken claim that Ziya Gökalp (1875-1924) is the real founder of Turkish sociology rather than Prince Sabahaddin. It is known that from his earlier ages Gökalp had been interested in general French sociology but in particular Durkheim's sociological views. In spite of this influence, Gökalp's sociological views and thesis on Turkish culture could not be seen as the only transmission or the adaptation of Durkheim's views into Turkish society:

Ziya Gökalp (1875-1924) was the real founder of Turkish sociology, since he was not a mere translator or interpreter of foreign sociology, though his sociological system was founded on Durkheim's works. He accepted Durkheim's methodological views as they were expounded in *Les regles de la methode sociologique*, and used all his terminology. By adaptation and additions to certain points he made his system almost a native product (Berkes, 1936, p. 242).

Regarding the sociological views of Gökalp, Kayalı (2008, p. 33) states that in the history of Turkish Sociology he is the first Turkish sociologist whose scientific objective is to explain local, social dynamics of Ottoman-Turkish society with the help of Western sociology. As previously stated, unlike Westernist intellectuals, he is not in favor of the transfer of social ideas and philosophies developed in Europe after the Enlightenment. Being aware of the secular dimension of modern civilization, Gökalp brought forth criticism against individualism developed in the Western culture; he was uncomfortable with individualism existed in the modern society because he believed that collectivism and social solidarity were much more adequate to the nature of Turkish society rather than individualism (Berkes, 1954). Therefore, although both Prince Sabahaddin and Gökalp had a decisive role in terms of the introduction of French sociology into Ottoman Turkish society, their sociological views were absolutely opposite to each other. Contrary to Prince Sabahaddin's far more liberal and individualist views, Gökalp was the advocate of both collectivism and statism, both of which subsequently became the founding ideologies of the new state especially after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Moreover, his views had a decisive role even during the last decade of the Ottoman Empire because he was the first Turkish intellectual propagated the idea of creating the national bourgeoisie *vis-a-vis* the rising non-Muslim bourgeoisie in Ottoman Society. Therefore, Gökalp could be also seen as the ideological founder of The Party of Union and Progress. Before the establishment of the first chair of sociology in Istanbul University in 1912, he started teaching sociology in Salonika. During his stay in Salonika, he delivered sociology lectures to the members of the Party of Union and Progress (Coşkun, 1991, p. 14).

After his return from Salonika to Istanbul, he founded the Department of Sociology at the Istanbul University in 1912. However, sociology education at the faculty did not last long because following the British occupation of Istanbul in 1917, he was exiled to Malta. From 1912 to 1917 he had thought sociology as a professor in that chair and also "founded a research institute of sociology, named as *İçtimaiyyat Dar'ül Mesaisi* and published *Journal of Sociology*" (Berkes, 1936, p. 243). Gökalp's membership to the Party of Union and Progress and his disciples' efforts contributed to the spread of sociology education not only in the Turkish universities but also in the secondary and high schools, especially after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 (Ülken, 2008, p. 51-52). During his captivity years in Malta, he gave sociology conferences to other Turkish prisoners. When Gökalp was exiled to Malta, his deputy Necmeddin Sadak became the head of the Department of Sociology, which regrettably deprived of its previous importance and weight that it had during the time of Gökalp (Coşkun, 1991, p. 16). Returning from Malta in 1921, Gökalp continued his studies on Turkish culture. Prior to his death in 1923, his work, *The Principles of Turkish Nationalism* was

published. As Berkes (1936, p. 244) illustrates the central themes that reoccur throughout his *oeuvre* are as follows:

He gave the results of his sociological approach to the social problems of Turkey to the political leaders of the nation in three words: “Turkify, Islamize, and Modernize,” which became a slogan in furthering the reformations of the country. He showed them which elements should constitute the national culture, and, on the basis of this culture, to what extent the elements of the Islamic and the European civilizations should be adopted or rejected, so as not to permit conflicts among these three forces which were reflected in the life of the people of his time.

Gökalp’s formulization of national culture as the most appropriate basis of synthesis among Turkification, Islamization and Westernization became the guiding principles or the basis of subsequent academic studies for social scientists studying on Turkish culture and religion. For instance, the works of Fuat Köprülü, especially his studies on Turkish culture, in particular, the religious culture of Turkish society could be seen as the studies too much inspired from Gökalp’s ideas concerning the socio-cultural structure of Ottoman society. In this sense, Gökalp could be seen as the first sociologist in Turkey as he stressed the presence of two opposing structures or dualism that could be observed, from music to religious beliefs in all areas of life in Ottoman-Turkish society, became the main obstacle to the modernization of Ottoman-Turkish society:

Until fifteen years ago there were two Turkish languages current in this country. One was official and was used exclusively for writing. This was called Ottoman. The other was the language of the common people. It was known, in a derogatory sense, as Turkish. It was believed to be the 'slang' of the common people. In fact, it was the real and natural language of the nation. The Ottoman language was nothing but an artificial mixture of the grammar, syntax, and vocabulary of Turkish, Arabic, and Persian Turkish developed naturally. It was the language of our own culture. Ottoman was a language consciously and rationally made by certain individuals. Only a few Turkish verbs or prepositions found their way into this mixture of languages. There was only a small fraction of our culture in it. It was the language of the civilization of the Ottomans (Gökalp, 1959, p. 105).

Gökalp believes that when the new Turkish nation overcomes this dualism by eliminating the artificial elements and residues diffused from foreign cultures and societies, such as Persian and Arabs into Turkish society, then a healthy synthesis between (Western) civilization and (national) culture becomes possible. Therefore, Gökalp’s view on the presence of two opposing structures or dualism in Ottoman-Turkish society either echoed or became a paradigm among the Turkish social scientists who studied Turkish culture or different socio-cultural dimensions of religion (Islam) in Turkish society. Moreover, Gökalp’s influence in Turkish social sciences continued until the 1960s. As Kayalı (2008, p. 33-34) stated that by the 1970s, most of the sociologists in Turkey, whether they were criticizing his ideas or not, published studies on Gökalp’s intellectual identity or his views. However, especially after the penetration of American sociological tradition in Turkey, academic interest in Gökalp subsequently began to decrease. After all, many Turkish sociologists believe that Gökalp is not only the real founder of Turkish sociology but also did introduce French Sociology, in particular, Durkheimian sociology into Turkish academy.

Concluding Remarks

There is a close relationship between the rise of Turkish intellectual movements - Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism- and the development of sociological thought in Ottoman-Turkish society. These rising intellectual movements mainly concerned with a central question: “How to save the State” from the *impasse*, resulted from Europe’s increasing political and economic dominance in the Balkans and the Middle East and the rise of political upheavals and nationalist movements among

the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman State. Therefore, in these worsening economic and political conditions of the empire, Ottoman intellectuals together with the members of modern state bureaucracy gradually turned their interest to Western social and political thoughts to find out solutions to such problems. From the nineteenth century onwards, while the Turkish intellectuals were opposing to the western domination in the Ottoman geography, they also sought solutions to their socio-economic problems, resulted from this dominance in western thought and techno-scientific developments in the West. This can be seen as the *Janus faces* of Turkish modernization.

In the late nineteenth century and evermore in the twentieth century, many Turkish intellectuals from different ideological camps, went to European cities, especially Paris and London either as students or exiles and they mostly focused on Western philosophy and sociology contrary to the basic purpose of being effective agents in transferring Western physical sciences and technology to the state. During this period, Prince Sabahaddin and Ziya Gökalp who were two prominent figures had a decisive role in terms of the development of Sociology, especially French sociology in Turkey. As many Turkish sociologists such as Berkes (1936) and Ülken (2007) claim that it was not Sabahaddin but Gökalp who was the real founder of Turkish sociology because Gökalp did not only first establish the Department of Sociology at the Istanbul University in 1912 but also had a decisive role in terms of expansion of French Sociology in general and the prominence of Durkheimian sociology in particular throughout Turkish academy. Although Gökalp's sociological approach was largely influenced by Durkheimian sociology, it is a great mistake to merely see Gökalp as a social scientist who just translated Durkheim's sociological views into Turkish sociology; however, in the history of Turkish sociology, he was the first sociologist whose scientific objective was to explain the aspects of Turkish culture with the help of Western sociology. Therefore, he conceived (positivist) sociology as an objective science that could play a very crucial role in terms of identifying not only the essentials of Turkish national culture but also how Turkish society could succeed in its modernization efforts in the twentieth century.

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